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Anti-Empire

offsite link Russia Holds Over 1700 Documented Ukrain... Sun May 15, 2022 22:53 | Field Empty

offsite link What Could Ever Be More Truthful Than a ... Sat May 14, 2022 22:27 | Field Empty

offsite link There Has Been a Series of Ukrainian Com... Sat May 14, 2022 01:19 | Anti-Empire

offsite link No More Trash — New Commenting Policy Fri May 13, 2022 23:54 | Anti-Empire

offsite link Another Week Another 78 Donetsk Soldiers... Fri May 13, 2022 21:04 | Anti-Empire

Anti-Empire >>

The Saker
A bird's eye view of the vineyard

offsite link President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Meeting of the heads of state of the Collective Security Treaty ... Mon May 16, 2022 19:08 | amarynth
CSTO summit Taking part in the meeting, timed to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the organisation, were the heads of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The main focus of the summit was on key issues

offsite link Death by a thousand cuts: where is the west?s Ukraine strategy? Mon May 16, 2022 17:26 | amarynth
The pounding, daily western narratives on ‘Ukrainian wins’ and ‘Russian losses’ underpins the lack of an actual, cohesive Grand Strategy against Moscow. By Pepe Escobar, posted with the author’s permission

offsite link FM Sergey Lavrov?s remarks at the 30th Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy Mon May 16, 2022 13:56 | amarynth
Moscow, May 14, 2022 Mr Lukyanov, Mr Karaganov, Colleagues, I am glad to be here again, at this anniversary assembly. Last time, we met in this room on October 2, 2021. But I

offsite link Sitrep Operation Z: Many Rumors and not enough Facts Mon May 16, 2022 12:27 | amarynth
For the Saker Blog by Saker Staff While battles are raging, factual reports are few.  This is fog of war and it is better not to report on the minutiae

offsite link Gonzalo Lira: Ukraine Soldiers Can?t Complain About Western Weapons Mon May 16, 2022 10:12 | amarynth

The Saker >>

Lockdown Skeptics

The Daily Sceptic

offsite link Keir Starmer to be Investigated by Police Over ?Beergate? Fri May 06, 2022 17:00 | Will Jones
Keir Starmer faces a police investigation into his lockdown curry, after repeatedly demanding Boris Johnson should quit for breaching rules.
The post Keir Starmer to be Investigated by Police Over ‘Beergate’ appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

offsite link On Energy, the EU Is Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place Fri May 06, 2022 15:58 | Noah Carl
To meet its climate goals, the EU needs to make new investments in renewable energy. But to transition away from Russian oil, it needs to upgrade its fossil fuel infrastructure. Either way, energy will cost more.
The post On Energy, the EU Is Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

offsite link The Toxic Perfectionism Young People Have Learned From Social Media and Covid Conformity Fri May 06, 2022 13:03 | Tom Shaw
Social media, aided by Covid conformity, has led to young people pursuing a toxic perfectionism, where you must be seen as master of life, not for your own wellbeing, but to justify your inclusion in the world.
The post The Toxic Perfectionism Young People Have Learned From Social Media and Covid Conformity appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

offsite link WHO?s Dubious Model that Claims the Real Pandemic Death Toll is 15 Million ? and 5 Million of Them A... Fri May 06, 2022 07:00 | Will Jones
The WHO has claimed that the real pandemic death toll is 15 million and 5 million of them are in India. But it's based on dubious modelling and the Indian Government has strongly disputed the claims.
The post WHO’s Dubious Model that Claims the Real Pandemic Death Toll is 15 Million ? and 5 Million of Them Are in India appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

offsite link News Round-Up Fri May 06, 2022 01:46 | Will Jones
A summary of all the most interesting stories that have appeared about politicians? efforts to control the virus ? and other acts of hubris and folly ? not just in Britain, but around the world.
The post News Round-Up appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Lockdown Skeptics >>

Voltaire Network
Voltaire, international edition

offsite link The Pentagon organizes Ukraine's victory at Eurovision 2022 Sun May 15, 2022 18:11 | en

offsite link China Concerned About US Military Biological Research in Ukraine Sun May 15, 2022 15:33 | en

offsite link Turkey opposed to Finland and Sweden joining NATO Sat May 14, 2022 13:40 | en

offsite link Saudi Arabia-US relations going to pieces Sat May 14, 2022 06:43 | en

offsite link AfriCom in Somaliland Fri May 13, 2022 20:50 | en

Voltaire Network >>

Field Empty - Sun May 15, 2022 22:53

Since I have lately written quite a bit about casualties in the Russian-Ukrainian war I should write a little bit on POWs.

Various estimates for Ukrainian POWs in Russian hands are being thrown around. Donetsk Republic at one point claimed to hold 3000. Various commentators have proposed various other figures.

However, the number of documented and verified Ukrainian POWs is 1742.

It is possible that the number is higher, but this is how many can be proven. The names, and the images of captives are available on Russian Telegram.

There have also been 12 prisoner exchanges so far which have seen nearly 300 POWs returned to Ukraine and presumably an equal number of Russian POWs returned to Russia. (Albeit I have seen claims that Russia received about 100 prisoners fewer because they were also trading prisoners for remains of their dead.)

I do not know if these 300 Ukrainians would have been from the 1742 POWs known to have been taken, or if they were returned before they were counted among them.

In other words, to be entirely precise we would have to say Russia at a minimum captured between 1700 and 2000 POWs and still holds between 1400 and 1700.

Over 1000 of the captured are from the 36th Marine Infantry Brigade that was encircled in Mariupol.

Russia also lost at least 350 POWs captured. (Ukraine claims 700 but you know how I feel about claims.)

On April 8 Russia publicized that a prisoner exchange that would see 251 Russian servicemen exchanged for 251 Ukrainian ones had fallen through.

This means that at this moment there were still at least 251 Russian servicemen in Ukrainian hands. (Likely more.)

However, by that date there had already been four prisoner exchanges that saw the return of 101 Ukrainian servicemen. Presumably 101 Russian servicemen traveled in the other direction.

This would give a total of 352 Russian servicemen that had fallen into Ukrainian hands. With up to 300 who have already been returned.

Early on in the war, the two sides were taking prisoners at a much more even rate.

Since the change in the Russian approach, this has changed.

Russian POWs have become rare, while Ukrainian POWs have multiplied especially due to Mariupol

Ukraine will likely become much more reluctant to trade away its rare Russian POWs.

Getting back a few hundred POWs back is relatively less valuable to Ukraine which is conscripting en masse, but much more so to Russia which Kremlin has precluded from tapping into its conscript manpower.

Since I have lately written quite a bit about casualties in the Russian-Ukrainian war I should write a little bit on POWs.

Various estimates for Ukrainian POWs in Russian hands are being thrown around. Donetsk Republic at one point claimed to hold 3000. Various commentators have proposed various other figures.

However, the number of documented and verified Ukrainian POWs is 1742.

It is possible that the number is higher, but this is how many can be proven. The names, and the images of captives are available on Russian Telegram.

There have also been 12 prisoner exchanges so far which have seen nearly 300 POWs returned to Ukraine and presumably an equal number of Russian POWs returned to Russia. (Albeit I have seen claims that Russia received about 100 prisoners fewer because they were also trading prisoners for remains of their dead.)

I do not know if these 300 Ukrainians would have been from the 1742 POWs known to have been taken, or if they were returned before they were counted among them.

In other words, to be entirely precise we would have to say Russia at a minimum captured between 1700 and 2000 POWs and still holds between 1400 and 1700.

Over 1000 of the captured are from the 36th Marine Infantry Brigade that was encircled in Mariupol.

Russia also lost at least 350 POWs captured. (Ukraine claims 700 but you know how I feel about claims.)

On April 8 Russia publicized that a prisoner exchange that would see 251 Russian servicemen exchanged for 251 Ukrainian ones had fallen through.

This means that at this moment there were still at least 251 Russian servicemen in Ukrainian hands. (Likely more.)

However, by that date there had already been four prisoner exchanges that saw the return of 101 Ukrainian servicemen. Presumably 101 Russian servicemen traveled in the other direction.

This would give a total of 352 Russian servicemen that had fallen into Ukrainian hands. With up to 300 who have already been returned.

Early on in the war, the two sides were taking prisoners at a much more even rate.

Since the change in the Russian approach, this has changed.

Russian POWs have become rare, while Ukrainian POWs have multiplied especially due to Mariupol

Ukraine will likely become much more reluctant to trade away its rare Russian POWs.

Getting back a few hundred POWs back is relatively less valuable to Ukraine which is conscripting en masse, but much more so to Russia which Kremlin has precluded from tapping into its conscript manpower.

Field Empty - Sat May 14, 2022 22:27

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense publishes an infographic every day where it "reveals" how many enemy tanks, trucks, heavy guns, troops, and aircraft they have "destroyed" each day. The infographic also comes with a running tally.

So according to Ukraine's MoD it has so far "liquidated" 27,200 enemy personnel including 300 in the last 24 hours. Along with 200 aircraft, 1200 tanks, and 5000 other kinds of vehicles.

There are actually people who take these releases seriously or pretend they do. The English-language Kyiv Post features the numbers prominently on its main site (Like covid "deaths" and "cases" used to be highlighted for us before.)

Of course, the idea that the Ukrainian MoD has an idea of enemy losses is silly. The only thing sillier is the idea that Ukrainian MoD has any reason to be truthful even if it could know them (which it can not).

The Ukrainian MoD is naturally engaged in waging an information war, upholding morale, and covering its own behind from domestic criticism.

What Ukrainian MoD is somewhat able to do is estimate its own losses but those it is not publicizing. — Again for precisely the same reasons it is pulling laughable numbers for enemy losses out of thin air.

The Russian MoD does the exact same thing.

Every day RUMOD publishes a running tally of how many armored vehicled, "field artillery and mortars," and other types of weapons it has "destroyed" in Ukraine.

The RUMOD tally differs from the UAMOD tally in that it does not keep track of enemy soldiers "killed". However RUMOD does publicize the number of "nationalists eliminated" in their daily reports for that day. For example Monday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of up to 350 nationalists and the neutralisation of 56 units of military equipment.

Tuesday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 400 nationalists and up to 48 armoured and motor vehicles.

Wednesday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 280 nationalists and up to 59 armoured and motor vehicles.

Thursday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 320 nationalists and up to 72 armoured and motor vehicles.

Friday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 300 nationalists and up to 37 armoured and motor vehicles.

RUMOD does also occasionally tally up these numbers. The last time was on April 16 when RUMOD claimed to know that Ukraine had until that point suffered "23367 irrecoverable losses" (dead, missing, POW).

For some strange reason some people who rightly laugh at UAMOD numbers then accept and bandy around RUMOD numbers.

RUMOD has absolutely no way of even ballparking Ukrainian losses (except by extrapolation from its own losses). And even if could know them (it can't) it has every incentive to exaggerate them several times over.

The number that RUMOD does know somewhat well — the number of its own dead — that's the one number it will not share. Because that one isn't propaganda.

Basing the losses of a warring side on what *their enemy claims about them* (during active hostilities no less) is just the most bizarre thing ever. 

RUMOD numbers don't even pass the sniff test. 23K thirty days ago implies 37K by now. So they have killed 37,000 Ukrainians (which implies many more wounded) and are "eliminating" 300-500 every day, yet they can not even encircle a static defensive position that has been there for 8 years. Come on, who's the fool here?

Add to that RUMOD has so far acknowledged only 1351 KIA for its own side. So RUMOD is saying that it is inflicting absolutely cataclysmic losses *with virtual impunity*yet its progress on the ground is measured in inches?

Substituting clear success on the ground for the dissemination of optimistic daily kill counts has been done before.

But the reality of the situation is that outside bizarro ledger wars like the American "metrics" quagmire in Vietnam, militaries do not even attempt to track enemy casualties. The reality is that to RUMOD the question of how many Ukrainians have been killed so far is all but irrelevant. This is trivia fixated on by civilians, but to warplanners — who know that wars aren't determined by losses but by successful operations — it has zero utility. What they want to know is the enemy strength and composition in the present. For that purpose they do reconnaissance. They don't scour last month's battle reports to try to tally up how many men the Ukrainian corps facing them may have lost last month. Because that number is irrelevant to them the information is not collected and not tallied up. It's only important for civilians and for them it can be just made up. In fact it's better if it is, because then it can be anything you want it to be. In fact, the truth is that the only reason the militaries keep track of even *their own* losses is so that they know which units require replacements and how many.

If the US was invading Iran and their two government defense departments were publishing colorful daily infographics on the number of tanks, mortars, and field guns destroyed how much credence would you give such creations? That's how much credence deserve the Ukrainian and the Russian versions.

These numbers are worse than useless. They are propaganda. Its misinformation exposure to which leaves one less informed than he started out. They are published knowing that they will be disbelieved, but with the hope that they will nonetheless color perceptions through anchoring bias.

(The even more ridiculous Rybar infographic will be tackled separately.)

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense publishes an infographic every day where it "reveals" how many enemy tanks, trucks, heavy guns, troops, and aircraft they have "destroyed" each day. The infographic also comes with a running tally.

So according to Ukraine's MoD it has so far "liquidated" 27,200 enemy personnel including 300 in the last 24 hours. Along with 200 aircraft, 1200 tanks, and 5000 other kinds of vehicles.

There are actually people who take these releases seriously or pretend they do. The English-language Kyiv Post features the numbers prominently on its main site (Like covid "deaths" and "cases" used to be highlighted for us before.)

Of course, the idea that the Ukrainian MoD has an idea of enemy losses is silly. The only thing sillier is the idea that Ukrainian MoD has any reason to be truthful even if it could know them (which it can not).

The Ukrainian MoD is naturally engaged in waging an information war, upholding morale, and covering its own behind from domestic criticism.

What Ukrainian MoD is somewhat able to do is estimate its own losses but those it is not publicizing. — Again for precisely the same reasons it is pulling laughable numbers for enemy losses out of thin air.

The Russian MoD does the exact same thing.

Every day RUMOD publishes a running tally of how many armored vehicled, "field artillery and mortars," and other types of weapons it has "destroyed" in Ukraine.

The RUMOD tally differs from the UAMOD tally in that it does not keep track of enemy soldiers "killed". However RUMOD does publicize the number of "nationalists eliminated" in their daily reports for that day. For example Monday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of up to 350 nationalists and the neutralisation of 56 units of military equipment.

Tuesday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 400 nationalists and up to 48 armoured and motor vehicles.

Wednesday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 280 nationalists and up to 59 armoured and motor vehicles.

Thursday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 320 nationalists and up to 72 armoured and motor vehicles.

Friday:

The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 300 nationalists and up to 37 armoured and motor vehicles.

RUMOD does also occasionally tally up these numbers. The last time was on April 16 when RUMOD claimed to know that Ukraine had until that point suffered "23367 irrecoverable losses" (dead, missing, POW).

For some strange reason some people who rightly laugh at UAMOD numbers then accept and bandy around RUMOD numbers.

RUMOD has absolutely no way of even ballparking Ukrainian losses (except by extrapolation from its own losses). And even if could know them (it can't) it has every incentive to exaggerate them several times over.

The number that RUMOD does know somewhat well — the number of its own dead — that's the one number it will not share. Because that one isn't propaganda.

Basing the losses of a warring side on what *their enemy claims about them* (during active hostilities no less) is just the most bizarre thing ever. 

RUMOD numbers don't even pass the sniff test. 23K thirty days ago implies 37K by now. So they have killed 37,000 Ukrainians (which implies many more wounded) and are "eliminating" 300-500 every day, yet they can not even encircle a static defensive position that has been there for 8 years. Come on, who's the fool here?

Add to that RUMOD has so far acknowledged only 1351 KIA for its own side. So RUMOD is saying that it is inflicting absolutely cataclysmic losses *with virtual impunity*yet its progress on the ground is measured in inches?

Substituting clear success on the ground for the dissemination of optimistic daily kill counts has been done before.

But the reality of the situation is that outside bizarro ledger wars like the American "metrics" quagmire in Vietnam, militaries do not even attempt to track enemy casualties. The reality is that to RUMOD the question of how many Ukrainians have been killed so far is all but irrelevant. This is trivia fixated on by civilians, but to warplanners — who know that wars aren't determined by losses but by successful operations — it has zero utility. What they want to know is the enemy strength and composition in the present. For that purpose they do reconnaissance. They don't scour last month's battle reports to try to tally up how many men the Ukrainian corps facing them may have lost last month. Because that number is irrelevant to them the information is not collected and not tallied up. It's only important for civilians and for them it can be just made up. In fact it's better if it is, because then it can be anything you want it to be. In fact, the truth is that the only reason the militaries keep track of even *their own* losses is so that they know which units require replacements and how many.

If the US was invading Iran and their two government defense departments were publishing colorful daily infographics on the number of tanks, mortars, and field guns destroyed how much credence would you give such creations? That's how much credence deserve the Ukrainian and the Russian versions.

These numbers are worse than useless. They are propaganda. Its misinformation exposure to which leaves one less informed than he started out. They are published knowing that they will be disbelieved, but with the hope that they will nonetheless color perceptions through anchoring bias.

(The even more ridiculous Rybar infographic will be tackled separately.)

Anti-Empire - Sat May 14, 2022 01:19

On two separate occasions units from the Ukrainian 79th Airborne withdrew from the front without order and refused to return. They complained of being poorly led by incompetent and cowardly officers. They complained about being poorly supplied and supported. They also complained about combat losses.

The men are mainly reservists called up after February 24, but there are also contract soldiers among them.

The 79th is fighting in Donbass along the Severodonetsk river to the east of Izyum. This sector has been one of the most active ones recently. It seems the 79th has been mauled heavily, but the unit remains in the field and has also inflicted casualties itself. (Eg 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.)

There has also been at least one instance of a unit from the Territorial Defense, the 101st from Transcarpathia, refusing to transfer to Donbass.

They complain that they have not been properly equipped and trained for the job. And that transfer to Donbass wasn't part of the deal when they signed up — originally territorial militias were guaranteed they would not be transferred out of their regions.

It is truly a shame that there has been such a self-imposed conspiracy of silence on the state of the Ukrainian military by Western reporters and commentators that prevents us from knowing more. Doubtlessly the Ukrainian military is suffering severe blows and is struggling to cope with a variety of problems, including unskilled or cowardly command and morale problems. Nonetheless it remains in the field, it continues to offer resistance, and it continues to make Russia's aims very, very difficult.

Also I think that these types of videos are part of the reason why Putin is so resistant to partial mobilization or even just using conscripts even though the Russian war effort so clearly cries out for more infantry. When things go awry battle formations composed solely of contract soldiers aren't going to go public and start making protest videos, but reservists and conscripts very well might.

Using reservists and conscripts is messy in more ways than one. It entails a lot more bartering, persuasion and collaboration with the people you are nominally ordering around. I think that Putin isn't quite yet ready to have to be bartering with the society and the soldiers in this way, and his system perhaps isn't capable of it. (Not that Ukrainian system is any better but they simply have no choice but to mobilize anyway.)

Anyway back to the combat refusal videos. They're all worth a watch. Very grim and revealing stuff. Brave men in more ways than one.

On two separate occasions units from the Ukrainian 79th Airborne withdrew from the front without order and refused to return. They complained of being poorly led by incompetent and cowardly officers. They complained about being poorly supplied and supported. They also complained about combat losses.

The men are mainly reservists called up after February 24, but there are also contract soldiers among them.

The 79th is fighting in Donbass along the Severodonetsk river to the east of Izyum. This sector has been one of the most active ones recently. It seems the 79th has been mauled heavily, but the unit remains in the field and has also inflicted casualties itself. (Eg 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.)

There has also been at least one instance of a unit from the Territorial Defense, the 101st from Transcarpathia, refusing to transfer to Donbass.

They complain that they have not been properly equipped and trained for the job. And that transfer to Donbass wasn't part of the deal when they signed up — originally territorial militias were guaranteed they would not be transferred out of their regions.

It is truly a shame that there has been such a self-imposed conspiracy of silence on the state of the Ukrainian military by Western reporters and commentators that prevents us from knowing more. Doubtlessly the Ukrainian military is suffering severe blows and is struggling to cope with a variety of problems, including unskilled or cowardly command and morale problems. Nonetheless it remains in the field, it continues to offer resistance, and it continues to make Russia's aims very, very difficult.

Also I think that these types of videos are part of the reason why Putin is so resistant to partial mobilization or even just using conscripts even though the Russian war effort so clearly cries out for more infantry. When things go awry battle formations composed solely of contract soldiers aren't going to go public and start making protest videos, but reservists and conscripts very well might.

Using reservists and conscripts is messy in more ways than one. It entails a lot more bartering, persuasion and collaboration with the people you are nominally ordering around. I think that Putin isn't quite yet ready to have to be bartering with the society and the soldiers in this way, and his system perhaps isn't capable of it. (Not that Ukrainian system is any better but they simply have no choice but to mobilize anyway.)

Anyway back to the combat refusal videos. They're all worth a watch. Very grim and revealing stuff. Brave men in more ways than one.

Anti-Empire - Fri May 13, 2022 23:54

The Anti-Empire Supporting Readers Telegram Group has been great. The best part about it has been just how respectful it has been. Even when we are trying to make points that are diametrically opposed we do so with respect.

It has been a breath of fresh air and a revelation.

From now on AE commenting section will be like that as well.

The days when AE commenting section could be anyone's garbage dump ends now.

From now on AE commenting section is going to look like a garden. Like a well-manicured garden in front of a holy site.

It's going to look like something that I can show to my mother and do so with pride.

You can share any take or content you want, but you are going to do so with respect. 

First and foremost with the respect for this site, where you are a guest, and for I, your host.

You are going to use a tone you would use when in my home and you're going to speak to me and about me as you would speak to my face.

Failing that I'm going to kick you out.

No more shitbergs, no swine, no parasites. No little bitches who are so brave on the internet.

You're not going to come to a place that I pour all this effort and love into and then try to talk smack that you would never dare utter in my presence.

I will not ban you from commenting. I will block your IP from being able to even visit the site, you little pieces of shit. And then I'm going to block your stupid VPNs.

Then you can try and be ingrate parasites somewhere else. Little scummy punks.

Respect for this product that you are opting to consume of your own will and that is brought to you free of charge by a modest number of good, grateful, appreciative reader-donors starts now.

A small coterie of shitbergs isn't going to be taking a dump all over what so many others find so valuable and dear.

The Anti-Empire Supporting Readers Telegram Group has been great. The best part about it has been just how respectful it has been. Even when we are trying to make points that are diametrically opposed we do so with respect.

It has been a breath of fresh air and a revelation.

From now on AE commenting section will be like that as well.

The days when AE commenting section could be anyone's garbage dump ends now.

From now on AE commenting section is going to look like a garden. Like a well-manicured garden in front of a holy site.

It's going to look like something that I can show to my mother and do so with pride.

You can share any take or content you want, but you are going to do so with respect. 

First and foremost with the respect for this site, where you are a guest, and for I, your host.

You are going to use a tone you would use when in my home and you're going to speak to me and about me as you would speak to my face.

Failing that I'm going to kick you out.

No more shitbergs, no swine, no parasites. No little bitches who are so brave on the internet.

You're not going to come to a place that I pour all this effort and love into and then try to talk smack that you would never dare utter in my presence.

I will not ban you from commenting. I will block your IP from being able to even visit the site, you little pieces of shit. And then I'm going to block your stupid VPNs.

Then you can try and be ingrate parasites somewhere else. Little scummy punks.

Respect for this product that you are opting to consume of your own will and that is brought to you free of charge by a modest number of good, grateful, appreciative reader-donors starts now.

A small coterie of shitbergs isn't going to be taking a dump all over what so many others find so valuable and dear.

Anti-Empire - Fri May 13, 2022 21:04

Donetsk continues to diligently update its war loss every week. (Lugansk, Russia and Ukraine continue to be mum.) In the seven days through May 12 another 78 Donetsk soldiers have perished. 495 were wounded.

This is a relatively low number compared to other weeks. At times Donetsk has lost over 200 soldiers killed in a week.

78 Donetsk deaths could mean around 50 military Lugansk deaths.

128 combined Donetsk and Lugansk deaths could mean 250 Russian deaths. (Russians have at least twice as many maneuver units involved, probably more.)

The total weekly death count for the entire coalition could be up to 400 (three times 128), but at least 250 (two times 128).

I'd probably put my point estimate at 350 for the entire coalition for the week, or about 50 killed every day. (11 Donetsk, 7 Lugansk, 30 Russian.)

That would also imply at least another 150 wounded each day.

Ukrainian losses are likely somewhat higher but even more uncertain.

 

Donetsk continues to diligently update its war loss every week. (Lugansk, Russia and Ukraine continue to be mum.) In the seven days through May 12 another 78 Donetsk soldiers have perished. 495 were wounded.

This is a relatively low number compared to other weeks. At times Donetsk has lost over 200 soldiers killed in a week.

78 Donetsk deaths could mean around 50 military Lugansk deaths.

128 combined Donetsk and Lugansk deaths could mean 250 Russian deaths. (Russians have at least twice as many maneuver units involved, probably more.)

The total weekly death count for the entire coalition could be up to 400 (three times 128), but at least 250 (two times 128).

I'd probably put my point estimate at 350 for the entire coalition for the week, or about 50 killed every day. (11 Donetsk, 7 Lugansk, 30 Russian.)

That would also imply at least another 150 wounded each day.

Ukrainian losses are likely somewhat higher but even more uncertain.

 

The Guardian - Fri May 13, 2022 02:00

Source: The Guardian

The top Democrat and Republican in the US Senate joined forces in a rare moment of unity on Thursday in an attempt to pass $40bn in aid for Ukraine, only to be stymied by a single Republican lawmaker: the Kentucky libertarian Rand Paul.

Faced with the prospect of an extended delay for the package that passed the House of Representatives on Tuesday, the Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, and his Republican counterpart, Mitch McConnell, sought to move forward on the aid package only to be blocked by Paul, a fiscal hawk who objects to the amount of spending proposed.

The stalemate delayed passage of the measure into next week.

The Senate has scheduled an initial procedural vote on the bill for late Monday afternoon.

It was unclear whether that vote would then speed passage of the Ukraine aid. Alternatively, passage could come around the middle of next week if any senator wants to force a series of legislative steps before a final vote.

As the Ukraine aid bill became caught in the Senate’s procedural gears, Schumer pleaded for fast action: “The package is ready to go, the vast majority of senators on both sides of the aisle want it.”

He added: “If Senator Paul persists in his reckless demands … all he will accomplish is to single-handedly delay desperately needed Ukraine aid.”

But Paul was not moved.

The delay into next week could cause problems for western countries trying to bolster Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

The Biden administration has said that by 19 May it expects to run out of available funds to draw on under an authority that allows the president to authorize the transfer of weapons without congressional approval in response to an emergency.

Paul is demanding that the legislation be altered to require an inspector general to oversee spending on Ukraine. Without his agreement, the Senate must follow a lengthy process stipulated by the chamber’s arcane rules.

McConnell, Paul’s fellow senator from Kentucky, weighed in, saying: “Ukraine is not asking us to fight this war. They’re only asking for the resources they need to defend themselves against this deranged invasion. And they need this help right now.”

The House passed the Ukraine spending bill by 368 to 57, with only Republicans voting against it.

Joe Biden had asked Congress to approve an additional $33bn in aid for Ukraine. But lawmakers decided to increase the military and humanitarian funding.

“This is the second spending bill for Ukraine in two months. And this bill is three times larger than the first,” Paul said before formally blocking the aid package. “Congress just wants to keep on spending, and spending.”

The aid package had previously included more spending for dealing with Covid-19 in the US, but the two causes were decoupled after Republicans balked.

Source: The Guardian

The top Democrat and Republican in the US Senate joined forces in a rare moment of unity on Thursday in an attempt to pass $40bn in aid for Ukraine, only to be stymied by a single Republican lawmaker: the Kentucky libertarian Rand Paul.

Faced with the prospect of an extended delay for the package that passed the House of Representatives on Tuesday, the Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, and his Republican counterpart, Mitch McConnell, sought to move forward on the aid package only to be blocked by Paul, a fiscal hawk who objects to the amount of spending proposed.

The stalemate delayed passage of the measure into next week.

The Senate has scheduled an initial procedural vote on the bill for late Monday afternoon.

It was unclear whether that vote would then speed passage of the Ukraine aid. Alternatively, passage could come around the middle of next week if any senator wants to force a series of legislative steps before a final vote.

As the Ukraine aid bill became caught in the Senate’s procedural gears, Schumer pleaded for fast action: “The package is ready to go, the vast majority of senators on both sides of the aisle want it.”

He added: “If Senator Paul persists in his reckless demands … all he will accomplish is to single-handedly delay desperately needed Ukraine aid.”

But Paul was not moved.

The delay into next week could cause problems for western countries trying to bolster Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

The Biden administration has said that by 19 May it expects to run out of available funds to draw on under an authority that allows the president to authorize the transfer of weapons without congressional approval in response to an emergency.

Paul is demanding that the legislation be altered to require an inspector general to oversee spending on Ukraine. Without his agreement, the Senate must follow a lengthy process stipulated by the chamber’s arcane rules.

McConnell, Paul’s fellow senator from Kentucky, weighed in, saying: “Ukraine is not asking us to fight this war. They’re only asking for the resources they need to defend themselves against this deranged invasion. And they need this help right now.”

The House passed the Ukraine spending bill by 368 to 57, with only Republicans voting against it.

Joe Biden had asked Congress to approve an additional $33bn in aid for Ukraine. But lawmakers decided to increase the military and humanitarian funding.

“This is the second spending bill for Ukraine in two months. And this bill is three times larger than the first,” Paul said before formally blocking the aid package. “Congress just wants to keep on spending, and spending.”

The aid package had previously included more spending for dealing with Covid-19 in the US, but the two causes were decoupled after Republicans balked.

Anti-Empire - Fri May 13, 2022 01:13

I'm not sure when this video was made. Was it before 2014 or after? (Perhaps prior to 2014 is likelier because there isn't a firearm in sight.)

In any case, the Azov leader Biletsky holds up Ratko Mladić as an example of a patriot of his people, just as he says they are patriots of Ukraine. Then everyone shouts Glory to Ukraine and Glory to Ratko Mladić.

Ratko Mladić is an Orthodox Christian who fought NATO.

I'm not sure when this video was made. Was it before 2014 or after? (Perhaps prior to 2014 is likelier because there isn't a firearm in sight.)

In any case, the Azov leader Biletsky holds up Ratko Mladić as an example of a patriot of his people, just as he says they are patriots of Ukraine. Then everyone shouts Glory to Ukraine and Glory to Ratko Mladić.

Ratko Mladić is an Orthodox Christian who fought NATO.

Anti-Empire - Thu May 12, 2022 16:27

He fell in October 1918, on a day that was so quiet and still on the whole front, that the army report confined itself to the single sentence: All quiet on the Western Front.

A weapon that can lob grenades 20 miles into the distance is a neat thing. But traditionally that didn't really mean that everything from the contact line into the depth of 20 miles was under threat.

Guns could fire 20 miles out, but there were few ways to see anything beyond the first line of defense. (There were artillery-spotting balloons and planes, but numbers and usefulness were limited.)

So if your side was in the process of rearranging forces and building up stockpiles, and the other side wasn't conducting an offensive either, then the front entered into a period of calm. Aside from aerial battles, the shelling of the first line, sniper duels, reconnaissance patrols, and other low-level tactical stuff not much would be going on that was casualty-producing.

That has all changed. Small drones have given artillery eyes. Now bombardment into enemy depth is trivial and everything that is in range of enemy guns is also very credibly under threat. Neither side has to be attempting an active offensive and yet casualties can be very high as targets abound.

Troops on the first line are usually heavily entrenched and not very vulnerable to artillery bombardment, but if the eyes of the artillery extend well into the enemy rear other, better targets will be found.

It has created a situation where quiet, low-casualty days are few and unlikely. Just rearranging forces or trying to amass them in preparation for an offensive can lead to high casualties. Now the active part of an offensive really begins as soon as you start assembling your forces for one. All of that has to be done under enemy long-range fire. (Part of the reason offensives on day one from Russian territory were far more successful than what we are seeing now.)

For whatever reason, the pre-war expectation of Western military experts that the Russians would be able to silence Ukrainian long-range guns has not panned out. This has had a very significant negative impact on the Russian ability to stage dramatic offensives because they're not able to prepare for them in peace. The challenge is almost like the challenge of preparing an offensive while under constant aerial attack (albeit only into the depth of 10 to 20 kilometers).

Now, the Russians do have their own guns, and many more of them. That means that they can back much more of the 800-km front with artillery, and can deliver much more devastating initial salvos.

However, the number of tubes is not everything. Situational awareness, target availability, ammunition availability and shells fired are all just as important. The Ukrainians may have fewer guns but what if they are able to find more targets of the juicy kind?

The Russians are expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition but they are mainly firing it at the fortified Ukrainian first line of defense. That is because as the defending side the Ukrainians can get away with presenting relatively few vulnerable targets in the rear. They can get away with moving in small dispersed groups and on foot, or in individual light vehicles. The Russians do not have that luxury. If they want to force a breakthrough they have to amass with heavy equipment and prepare stockpiles close to the front. Such preparations are much more easily disrupted by guided artillery than is infantry in trenches.

So the Ukrainians are firing fewer shells but a higher proportion of theirs is against the more vulnerable targets like ammo depots, supply trucks, and tanks out in the open.

This is all to say that there are *objective* reasons why the Russian effort since the withdrawal from Kiev to the present has advanced at a snail's pace. The lack of speed is explained neither by deep-seated or all-around Russian incompetence, nor by the laughable notion that the Russians are going it slow "on purpose".

They are going it slow because anyone in their position could only go slow. The Russians have potent air defenses but these are geared toward countering a relatively small number of high-performance aircraft. But to a flood of disposable drones they don't have an answer (especially when the drones know exactly where to fly to because of US-provided satellite imagery). They entered the war unprepared to tackle this new weapon (ironic considering how much they have relied on small drones in Syria and at Debaltsevo themselves) and are doing as well as would anyone at a similar level of preparedness. (Anyone without America's air-to-ground capability.)

And once again: truly a lot is being asked of the Russian soldier. They are asked to amass in preparation for offensive while constantly under threat of coming under fire from 10 to 20 kilometers away.

He fell in October 1918, on a day that was so quiet and still on the whole front, that the army report confined itself to the single sentence: All quiet on the Western Front.

A weapon that can lob grenades 20 miles into the distance is a neat thing. But traditionally that didn't really mean that everything from the contact line into the depth of 20 miles was under threat.

Guns could fire 20 miles out, but there were few ways to see anything beyond the first line of defense. (There were artillery-spotting balloons and planes, but numbers and usefulness were limited.)

So if your side was in the process of rearranging forces and building up stockpiles, and the other side wasn't conducting an offensive either, then the front entered into a period of calm. Aside from aerial battles, the shelling of the first line, sniper duels, reconnaissance patrols, and other low-level tactical stuff not much would be going on that was casualty-producing.

That has all changed. Small drones have given artillery eyes. Now bombardment into enemy depth is trivial and everything that is in range of enemy guns is also very credibly under threat. Neither side has to be attempting an active offensive and yet casualties can be very high as targets abound.

Troops on the first line are usually heavily entrenched and not very vulnerable to artillery bombardment, but if the eyes of the artillery extend well into the enemy rear other, better targets will be found.

It has created a situation where quiet, low-casualty days are few and unlikely. Just rearranging forces or trying to amass them in preparation for an offensive can lead to high casualties. Now the active part of an offensive really begins as soon as you start assembling your forces for one. All of that has to be done under enemy long-range fire. (Part of the reason offensives on day one from Russian territory were far more successful than what we are seeing now.)

For whatever reason, the pre-war expectation of Western military experts that the Russians would be able to silence Ukrainian long-range guns has not panned out. This has had a very significant negative impact on the Russian ability to stage dramatic offensives because they're not able to prepare for them in peace. The challenge is almost like the challenge of preparing an offensive while under constant aerial attack (albeit only into the depth of 10 to 20 kilometers).

Now, the Russians do have their own guns, and many more of them. That means that they can back much more of the 800-km front with artillery, and can deliver much more devastating initial salvos.

However, the number of tubes is not everything. Situational awareness, target availability, ammunition availability and shells fired are all just as important. The Ukrainians may have fewer guns but what if they are able to find more targets of the juicy kind?

The Russians are expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition but they are mainly firing it at the fortified Ukrainian first line of defense. That is because as the defending side the Ukrainians can get away with presenting relatively few vulnerable targets in the rear. They can get away with moving in small dispersed groups and on foot, or in individual light vehicles. The Russians do not have that luxury. If they want to force a breakthrough they have to amass with heavy equipment and prepare stockpiles close to the front. Such preparations are much more easily disrupted by guided artillery than is infantry in trenches.

So the Ukrainians are firing fewer shells but a higher proportion of theirs is against the more vulnerable targets like ammo depots, supply trucks, and tanks out in the open.

This is all to say that there are *objective* reasons why the Russian effort since the withdrawal from Kiev to the present has advanced at a snail's pace. The lack of speed is explained neither by deep-seated or all-around Russian incompetence, nor by the laughable notion that the Russians are going it slow "on purpose".

They are going it slow because anyone in their position could only go slow. The Russians have potent air defenses but these are geared toward countering a relatively small number of high-performance aircraft. But to a flood of disposable drones they don't have an answer (especially when the drones know exactly where to fly to because of US-provided satellite imagery). They entered the war unprepared to tackle this new weapon (ironic considering how much they have relied on small drones in Syria and at Debaltsevo themselves) and are doing as well as would anyone at a similar level of preparedness. (Anyone without America's air-to-ground capability.)

And once again: truly a lot is being asked of the Russian soldier. They are asked to amass in preparation for offensive while constantly under threat of coming under fire from 10 to 20 kilometers away.

Viktor Biryukov - Thu May 12, 2022 12:19

Editor's note: Let's forget for a moment about Western fantasists and weirdos. What are Russian military writers saying about the war themselves?

For the record, "everything is proceeding according to plan" is a meme in Russia. Outside of government circles it is only ever uttered ironically to ridicule the government.

There's even an ironic 1980s punk song "Everything Is Going According to Plan".


Source: Военное обозрение (Military Review)

Machine translated from Russian.

Three weeks have passed since Russia announced the second stage of the special operation, the main goal of which was the complete liberation of Donbass and control over southern Ukraine. All this time, heavy fighting continues in the Donbass with slow advances of the People's Militia of the LDNR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but a radical change has not yet occurred. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv direction. Is everything really going according to plan, as Dmitry Peskov says, or is Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who recently announced that the special operation was dragging on, right?

The heaviest and most fierce battles are currently going on in the Donbass near Popasnaya, which recently almost completely came under the control of the national militia of the LNR and the Russian armed forces, and on the southern outskirts of Rubizhne, north of Severodonetsk. Rubizhnoye and Popasnaya have long been cities where stubborn and bloody battles took place with numerous casualties on both sides. The Ukrainian units were well prepared for the defense, having equipped firing positions in the basements and "fire bags". Eyewitnesses of the events spoke about the latter in sufficient detail. For example, one of the participants in the battles for Rubizhne described the battles for a garage cooperative located in the eastern part of the city in this way:

They prepared their positions well. To the south of the positions is a lowland sheltering from artillery. Messages are displayed to it. At the ends of the streets leading north through the village there are concrete pillboxes. In the settlement quarters themselves, “fire bags” were organized in advance - sectors for cross-fire were cleared, machine-gun points were equipped in the basements, and sniper positions were prepared. And in the "bags" themselves, paths are carefully laid - fences and sheds are pierced. Fighters trying to conduct reconnaissance in battle, so as not to walk along the streets being shot through, go in yards. They don't know who punched the passages - maybe ours. And along these passages they come under the crossfire of machine guns and snipers. Groups perished without even realizing that they were being fired upon.

The situation was greatly complicated by the lack of UAVs, digital closed communications and lack of medicines among the units that stormed Rubizhne. Modern combat should still not be conducted according to the principle “go, storm the positions in the forehead”, but in a completely different way. UAVs find enemy positions, and then artillery, which is corrected by drones, destroys these positions to zero, and only then the infantry gets down to business. Unfortunately, many units of the national militia of the LPR, with the exception of the "Ghost", which for many years really prepared for war, were not provided with either drones, or communications, or even normal uniforms.

At the moment, Rubizhne and Popasnaya have almost completely come under the control of the People's Militia of the LPR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and only Lisichansk and Severodonetsk remain under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is not yet clear in what time frame they will be able to be taken: if the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are suffering heavy losses, decide to retreat from these settlements in the direction of Seversk, then in the near future the territory of the LPR will be completely liberated. If the Ukrainian military will defend themselves on the same principle as in Rubizhne and Popasna, then the battles for these settlements may last for several more weeks. In the DPR, the situation is much more complicated, because the enemy is still standing on the outskirts of Donetsk and is carrying out fierce shelling of the city. The attacks of the NM DPR on Avdeevka have not yet yielded any results.

The situation is even more complicated in the Kharkov direction, where the enemy attempted a counteroffensive in all directions at once. Heavy fighting is taking place near Izyum, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine are trying to impede the advance of Russian troops, and near Kharkov, the Ukrainian military managed to recapture several settlements. We are talking about the villages of Russkaya Lozovaya, Kutuzovka, Stary Saltov, Russian Tishki, Tsirkuny.

In the villages of Russkaya Lozovaya and Kutuzovka, there were units of the People's Militia of the LDNR, formed mainly from mobilized residents of the republics. They had practically no heavy weapons, so they had no chance against a tank attack, which was accompanied by heavy artillery fire. From a number of settlements had to retreat.

In the southern direction, the operational situation as a whole remains unchanged, with the exception of the situation around Zmeiny Island. Apparently, Ukraine is making an attempt to lift the naval blockade and push the Black Sea Fleet towards the Crimea. In fact, now there is a war for control over the Black Sea, and Zmeiny Island plays an important role here. It is known that Ukrainian aviation attacked the island several times, and with the help of the Bayraktar UAV, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to hit a Russian boat. Subsequently, the Black Sea Fleet evacuated military personnel from the island, and Ukraine tried to land troops there. The attempt ended unsuccessfully: two Ukrainian Su-24 bombers and a Mi-24 helicopter were shot down.

In addition, in recent days, the Russian Aerospace Forces have been delivering powerful missile strikes on Odessa and Nikolaev, but whether this is preparation for an offensive in this direction is still unclear.

The forecast of the former field commander of the DPR militia Igor Strelkov that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will only be “squeezed out” from Donbass over many weeks, or even several months and only with heavy losses is fully justified so far. And taking into account the fact that the enemy is constantly introducing reserves into battle, which are created due to waves of mobilization, it is still unclear how the Russian Ministry of Defense will stop the introduction of new units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into battle. Partial mobilization at the moment looks inevitable, but this is not a way out of the situation. The mobilized will still need to be trained and trained for a couple of months, so at first it will be possible to use them only to protect secondary sectors on the border with Russia.

The key problems of the current Russian army are the lack of reconnaissance equipment, i.e. UAVs, problems of interaction with artillery (fire adjustment is poorly adjusted), and a generally low level of command and control. At the moment, it is required to saturate the army of UAVs of all levels, without this it will be difficult to achieve a decisive turning point in the war. The fact that Rostec announced its intention to create miniature drones for the Russian military is, of course, wonderful, but the speed of decision-making is simply incredible.

In general, at the moment the army needs not so much the mobilization of human resources (although this too), but the mobilization of industry, the mass production of UAVs and communications equipment. [Or just quickly order these items from China, or would vested interests be against that?]


Editor's note: You may also want to scroll down to the comment section of the original Russian article, and see which comments are getting upvoted (realist ones) and which downvoted (the butthurt ones).

So that's really something. While the Russians are realistic about how the war is proceeding (they have to be, they can not afford illusions), Western weirdos without skin in the game are having butthurt hysteria meltdowns to defend a cringe fantasy where "Ukraine was defeated in the first 3 days".

Editor's note: Let's forget for a moment about Western fantasists and weirdos. What are Russian military writers saying about the war themselves?

For the record, "everything is proceeding according to plan" is a meme in Russia. Outside of government circles it is only ever uttered ironically to ridicule the government.

There's even an ironic 1980s punk song "Everything Is Going According to Plan".


Source: Военное обозрение (Military Review)

Machine translated from Russian.

Three weeks have passed since Russia announced the second stage of the special operation, the main goal of which was the complete liberation of Donbass and control over southern Ukraine. All this time, heavy fighting continues in the Donbass with slow advances of the People's Militia of the LDNR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but a radical change has not yet occurred. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv direction. Is everything really going according to plan, as Dmitry Peskov says, or is Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who recently announced that the special operation was dragging on, right?

The heaviest and most fierce battles are currently going on in the Donbass near Popasnaya, which recently almost completely came under the control of the national militia of the LNR and the Russian armed forces, and on the southern outskirts of Rubizhne, north of Severodonetsk. Rubizhnoye and Popasnaya have long been cities where stubborn and bloody battles took place with numerous casualties on both sides. The Ukrainian units were well prepared for the defense, having equipped firing positions in the basements and "fire bags". Eyewitnesses of the events spoke about the latter in sufficient detail. For example, one of the participants in the battles for Rubizhne described the battles for a garage cooperative located in the eastern part of the city in this way:

They prepared their positions well. To the south of the positions is a lowland sheltering from artillery. Messages are displayed to it. At the ends of the streets leading north through the village there are concrete pillboxes. In the settlement quarters themselves, “fire bags” were organized in advance - sectors for cross-fire were cleared, machine-gun points were equipped in the basements, and sniper positions were prepared. And in the "bags" themselves, paths are carefully laid - fences and sheds are pierced. Fighters trying to conduct reconnaissance in battle, so as not to walk along the streets being shot through, go in yards. They don't know who punched the passages - maybe ours. And along these passages they come under the crossfire of machine guns and snipers. Groups perished without even realizing that they were being fired upon.

The situation was greatly complicated by the lack of UAVs, digital closed communications and lack of medicines among the units that stormed Rubizhne. Modern combat should still not be conducted according to the principle “go, storm the positions in the forehead”, but in a completely different way. UAVs find enemy positions, and then artillery, which is corrected by drones, destroys these positions to zero, and only then the infantry gets down to business. Unfortunately, many units of the national militia of the LPR, with the exception of the "Ghost", which for many years really prepared for war, were not provided with either drones, or communications, or even normal uniforms.

At the moment, Rubizhne and Popasnaya have almost completely come under the control of the People's Militia of the LPR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and only Lisichansk and Severodonetsk remain under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is not yet clear in what time frame they will be able to be taken: if the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are suffering heavy losses, decide to retreat from these settlements in the direction of Seversk, then in the near future the territory of the LPR will be completely liberated. If the Ukrainian military will defend themselves on the same principle as in Rubizhne and Popasna, then the battles for these settlements may last for several more weeks. In the DPR, the situation is much more complicated, because the enemy is still standing on the outskirts of Donetsk and is carrying out fierce shelling of the city. The attacks of the NM DPR on Avdeevka have not yet yielded any results.

The situation is even more complicated in the Kharkov direction, where the enemy attempted a counteroffensive in all directions at once. Heavy fighting is taking place near Izyum, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine are trying to impede the advance of Russian troops, and near Kharkov, the Ukrainian military managed to recapture several settlements. We are talking about the villages of Russkaya Lozovaya, Kutuzovka, Stary Saltov, Russian Tishki, Tsirkuny.

In the villages of Russkaya Lozovaya and Kutuzovka, there were units of the People's Militia of the LDNR, formed mainly from mobilized residents of the republics. They had practically no heavy weapons, so they had no chance against a tank attack, which was accompanied by heavy artillery fire. From a number of settlements had to retreat.

In the southern direction, the operational situation as a whole remains unchanged, with the exception of the situation around Zmeiny Island. Apparently, Ukraine is making an attempt to lift the naval blockade and push the Black Sea Fleet towards the Crimea. In fact, now there is a war for control over the Black Sea, and Zmeiny Island plays an important role here. It is known that Ukrainian aviation attacked the island several times, and with the help of the Bayraktar UAV, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to hit a Russian boat. Subsequently, the Black Sea Fleet evacuated military personnel from the island, and Ukraine tried to land troops there. The attempt ended unsuccessfully: two Ukrainian Su-24 bombers and a Mi-24 helicopter were shot down.

In addition, in recent days, the Russian Aerospace Forces have been delivering powerful missile strikes on Odessa and Nikolaev, but whether this is preparation for an offensive in this direction is still unclear.

The forecast of the former field commander of the DPR militia Igor Strelkov that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will only be “squeezed out” from Donbass over many weeks, or even several months and only with heavy losses is fully justified so far. And taking into account the fact that the enemy is constantly introducing reserves into battle, which are created due to waves of mobilization, it is still unclear how the Russian Ministry of Defense will stop the introduction of new units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into battle. Partial mobilization at the moment looks inevitable, but this is not a way out of the situation. The mobilized will still need to be trained and trained for a couple of months, so at first it will be possible to use them only to protect secondary sectors on the border with Russia.

The key problems of the current Russian army are the lack of reconnaissance equipment, i.e. UAVs, problems of interaction with artillery (fire adjustment is poorly adjusted), and a generally low level of command and control. At the moment, it is required to saturate the army of UAVs of all levels, without this it will be difficult to achieve a decisive turning point in the war. The fact that Rostec announced its intention to create miniature drones for the Russian military is, of course, wonderful, but the speed of decision-making is simply incredible.

In general, at the moment the army needs not so much the mobilization of human resources (although this too), but the mobilization of industry, the mass production of UAVs and communications equipment. [Or just quickly order these items from China, or would vested interests be against that?]


Editor's note: You may also want to scroll down to the comment section of the original Russian article, and see which comments are getting upvoted (realist ones) and which downvoted (the butthurt ones).

So that's really something. While the Russians are realistic about how the war is proceeding (they have to be, they can not afford illusions), Western weirdos without skin in the game are having butthurt hysteria meltdowns to defend a cringe fantasy where "Ukraine was defeated in the first 3 days".

Sergey Markov - Thu May 12, 2022 09:36

Source: Excerpt from Komsomolskaya Pravda

Machine translated from Russian.

The Ukrainian army turned out to be much stronger than it was assumed, looking from Russia, and much stronger than it was seen by Western analysts. In 2014, 87% of the Ukrainian army stationed in Crimea sided with Russia, the remaining 13%, in fact, took a neutral position and refused to fight with the Russian army.

In 2022, not a single unit of the Ukrainian army switched to the Russian side, and not a single unit refused to fight. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are engaged in such fierce battles that they forced the Russians to radically change their military strategy. So what is the strength of the army of Ukraine?

The Ukrainian army is an amazing and very strong combination of a Russian soldier, a fascist officer and an American general, in many respects it is really the army of the XXI century, and to a much greater extent than most other armies in the world. [Quite the sight to see Komsomolskaya Pravda extolling the competency of the fascist officer.]

The rank and file are Russian people; the language of the Ukrainian army is Russian. The Russian soldier for centuries is considered one of the strongest in the world. This is a soldier who is ready to risk his life, to give it up for the sake of fulfilling the orders of the commander and the oath.

Read the rest: Link

Source: Excerpt from Komsomolskaya Pravda

Machine translated from Russian.

The Ukrainian army turned out to be much stronger than it was assumed, looking from Russia, and much stronger than it was seen by Western analysts. In 2014, 87% of the Ukrainian army stationed in Crimea sided with Russia, the remaining 13%, in fact, took a neutral position and refused to fight with the Russian army.

In 2022, not a single unit of the Ukrainian army switched to the Russian side, and not a single unit refused to fight. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are engaged in such fierce battles that they forced the Russians to radically change their military strategy. So what is the strength of the army of Ukraine?

The Ukrainian army is an amazing and very strong combination of a Russian soldier, a fascist officer and an American general, in many respects it is really the army of the XXI century, and to a much greater extent than most other armies in the world. [Quite the sight to see Komsomolskaya Pravda extolling the competency of the fascist officer.]

The rank and file are Russian people; the language of the Ukrainian army is Russian. The Russian soldier for centuries is considered one of the strongest in the world. This is a soldier who is ready to risk his life, to give it up for the sake of fulfilling the orders of the commander and the oath.

Read the rest: Link

Anti-Empire >>

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